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Central Bank Independence in the Southern African Development Community: 
Legal Reform Progress and Prospects 
 
Mzwanele Mfunwa and Henry Lubinda 
 
(UN Economic Commission for Africa) 
 
 
 
Public commitments by political leaders to fast-track economic integration in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) have been at variance with the extremely slow pace of 
domesticating the 2009 SADC Central Bank Model Law. This paper identifies specific legislative 
gaps in the national central bank laws that member states need to address in order to enhance 
institutional uniformity and promote central bank independence in the SADC region. Countries with 
recent amendments have made adjustments for more compliance, while others have not done so. 
The paper recommends that member states should speedily effect the needed legislative 
alignments if the frequently delayed economic integration agenda is to move apace. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Central Bank Model Law (SADC, 
2009) was adopted by the SADC Committee of Central Bank Governors in 2009 to promote 
closer cooperation among the region’s central banks. The Model Law encourages the 
adoption of general codes to facilitate operational independence, establish transparency 
and accountability standards, and facilitate the harmonisation of legal and operational 
frameworks of SADC’s central banks. Through the Model Law the SADC leadership are 
supporting the “independence of the central bank [as] (…) a condition sine qua non for the 
achievement of price stability” (SADC, 2011). 
Worldwide central bank statutes make extensive use of the term ‘independence’. In 
the literature however the label ‘autonomy’ is sometimes preferred seeing that it entails 
operational freedom, whereas the expression ‘independence’ may indicate freedom from 
institutional constraints (Mfunwa, 1998: 9). Henceforth this paper will adopt the term 
‘independence’ because of its wider use in the region, even if both terms refer essentially to 
the same status. ‘Price stability’ describes an economic and financial environment where 
inflation is so low as not to be a factor in economic agents’ decision making processes 
(Blinder, 1995). 
Central bank independence (CBI) is defined in terms of a mixture of political, 
economic and informal factors. Political independence is largely determined by the 
relationship between the central bank and the government in monetary policy formulation, 
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including the authority to choose the final policy goal of a certain inflation rate or level of 
economic activity, and procedures for the appointment and removal of central bank head. 
Economic or financial independence refers to the financial and budgetary relationship 
between the central bank and government, including lending to the government (Mfunwa, 
1998: 18). The informal factors are difficult to assess and include whether central bank 
governors serve their full terms of office, particularly when there is a change of 
government; personalities, educational and occupational background of principal officials 
within the central bank; and the quality of the central bank’s research programme. 
The need for price stability in the SADC region was brought to the fore when 
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation reached the 231 million percent rate in July 2008 (Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe, 2012). Secondly, when South Africa’s public protector recently 
adjudged the central bank’s price stability mandate as ‘too narrow’, the public reaction was 
visceral and negative. Besides lessons from Zimbabwe, South Africa’s economy is about half 
of the region’s total economy and several neighbours’ currencies are linked to the Rand, 
especially in the context of the Southern African Customs Union. Therefore, price instability 
in South Africa would destabilise the entire SADC economy. 
By understanding the mismatches between the SADC Model Law and individual 
country laws, this paper is commenting on the independence of country central banks. It is 
important to state upfront that this paper does not seek to assess the reliability and 
consistency of the SADC Model Law against the stricter elements of the CBI. With this 
caveat in mind, this paper’s main objective is to ascertain the extent to which central bank 
laws among 12 countries in the SADC region comply with the new regional model law; it 
identifies areas requiring amendments.1 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
briefly reviews literature on the theoretical rationale for granting independence to regional 
and national central banks, from which the SADC Model Law draws its inspiration. Section 
3 highlights the key elements of CBI that form part of the Model Law. Section 4 unpacks the 
various central bank laws in the SADC region and highlights areas of convergence with and 
divergence from the adopted regional model law. Section 5 provides recommendations and 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review: Solving the Inflationary Bias of Monetary Policy  
 
The theoretical foundations of the SADC Model Law are found in the Finn E. Kydland and 
Edward C. Prescott model (1977), which sought to solve the time-inconsistency problem of 
policy making. Titled ‘Rules Rather than Discretion’, the model argued that monetary 
authorities’ policy decisions are often time-inconsistent; that is, monetary policy changes 
intended to remedy an immediate problem such as unemployment will often have 
                                                          
1 Central bank laws of three other SADC member states (Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Mozambique) were not available in English, and therefore could not be reviewed due to language limitations 
of the authors. 
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unintended outcomes that work against the goal of reducing joblessness. When a 
government announces a remedy to a short-term problem, individuals and firms adjust 
their behaviour and make new decisions based on that information. Those decisions 
change the economic landscape, obviating the need for the government to fulfill its 
promise on policy changes. Thus, if a government has the discretion to pursue any policy it 
wants, given the particular economic situation on the ground, and cannot remain 
committed to the promises it makes, a credibility problem arises. To counter this, it is 
wiser for a central bank to focus on long-range goals and not interfere in the economy too 
aggressively by trying to boost employment or boost economic activity in the short run. 
The model underscored the critical importance of policy consistency over time rather than 
thinking about what is optimal right now. 
The Kydland-Prescott model was followed by the work of Robert Barro and David 
Gordon (1983) who added a ‘rational expectations’ idea to the original model. The rational 
expectations theory argues that people make choices based on their rational outlook, 
available information and past experiences. In the Kydland-Prescott model the 
government policy could influence people's decisions in the short run, while no such 
influence exists in the Barro-Gordon model because the current expectations in the 
economy are the same as what people think the future state of the economy will become. 
Simply put, if government attempts to reduce unemployment or stimulate economic 
activity using monetary policy, this action can only lead to higher inflation without 
achieving the intended goal. In this regard, the attempt will only trigger inflation in wages 
and engender generalised inflation; the unemployment rate or economic activity will 
remain unchanged. As such, the monetary policy stimulus will have no real effects on the 
economy other than inducing price instability. 
These models brought fundamental changes to how monetary policy is conducted 
worldwide. Institutionally, they have influenced how central bank frameworks are 
calibrated to enhance operational independence, thereby injecting credibility in the face of 
short-term changes in the economy. Many central banks around the world have committed 
themselves to a long-range policy of seeking price stability. Moreover, from the early 
1990s countries such as New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa, Thailand and Argentina have 
adopted an inflation-targeting policy – a specific range for inflation that the central bank 
commits to pursuing (Central Bank News, 2017). To a very large degree, the SADC Model 
Law has adopted these models’ principles for enhanced CBI. However, there are areas 
where this law is accommodating regional peculiarities that may therefore be less strict 
than other regions’ regional laws, such as the European Union. 
 
3. Determinants of Central Bank Independence 
 
The determinants of CBI are theoretically and empirically well studied, among others in the 
work of Cukierman (1992), and Alesina and Summers (1993); whereas the studies by 
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Presnak (1996), Wessels (2004) and Wessels (2009) have offered insights on CBI in 
Southern African countries. This section discusses formal or de jure independence 
determinants and how the SADC Model Law incorporates them. This paper does not 
concern itself with informal determinants of CBI although these may be more important in 
practice than formal determinants. 
 Outlined below are key elements of CBI that charters or statutes of central banks 
should contain to entrench formal political and economic independence. 
 
3.1 Political Elements of Central Bank Independence 
 
Clarity of objective(s): The primary objective of the central bank should be to maintain 
price stability. If the act assigns multiple objectives such as promoting economic growth or 
employment creation, then price stability should be stated as the principal objective which 
should prevail in cases where policy conflicts arise (Alesina and Summers, 1993). Regional 
monetary authorities have embraced this element (for example, the European Central Bank 
ECB, 1997). In this regard, sections 4, 5 and 6 of the SADC Model Law state that while the 
national central bank may support general economic policies of the country, its primary 
monetary policy objective should be price stability. The central bank should pursue this 
objective independently and without fear, favour, prejudice or direction from any authority 
or institution. 
    
Governing structure of the bank: Political appointments to the central bank board should 
be prohibited but if that is not the case, then the legislature should ratify such 
appointments. This is to shield the board from political manipulation (Alesina and 
Summers, 1993). The SADC Model Law embraces this principle, with sections 11 and 14 
stipulating that the governors and directors of the central bank should be appointed by the 
Head of State. Alternatively, the Head of State can merely nominate these persons, and the 
legislature should ratify such nominations. Section 8 establishes the Board of Directors 
with a responsibility to determine the central bank governance policy, consisting, among 
others, of the governor as chairperson.         
  
Governors and Board of Directors: The governors’ tenure of office should exceed or 
straddle the term of office of politicians in the executive and legislative arms of 
governments (Alesina and Summers, 1993). This principle, which is contained in the SADC 
Model Law, seeks to ensure that governors are more impervious to undue political 
pressure and ensures the retention of a central bank’s institutional memory. The Model 
Law further recommends that the governors should be appointed for a renewable six-year 
term. However, the governors’ office terms should not coincide with parliamentary 
elections. 
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Coordination between monetary and fiscal policy: The SADC Model Law’s section 43 states 
that without prejudice to the powers of the central bank to formulate and implement 
monetary policy and to any other provisions of the act, the central bank shall consult with 
the minister responsible for financial matters in areas necessary to ensure coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies (Alesina and Summers, 1993). 
 
Accountability and transparency: The Model Law’s section 61 stipulates that the central 
bank should submit to the minister an annual report containing among other information, 
the annual accounts, the central bank’s operations, report on the state of the economy and 
the conduct of monetary policy. The report should also be published. The minister shall 
table such annual report in parliament. Furthermore, Section 62 requires that the governor 
appear before parliament at least twice a year and at any other time as parliament or the 
governor may request, to report, among others, on the current operations and affairs of the 
bank, the state of the economy and the conduct of monetary policy (Alesina and Summers, 
1993). 
 
Absence of politicians and representatives of private banks on the Board: No politicians or 
private bank representatives should be allowed on the central bank board. Should 
government have a representative, then it should not have voting powers on monetary 
policy stances (Alesina and Summers, 1993). The SADC Model Law (section 17) directs that 
a person should not be appointed as or remain a board member if s/he becomes a member 
of cabinet, parliament, other executive or legislative authority; civil servants (except if they 
do not have voting rights); director, officer, employee or a shareholder in a bank or 
financial institution; or provides or is appointed to provide professional services to the 
central bank, or any financial institution. 
 
3.2 Economic Components of Central Bank Independence 
 
Financial independence: The SADC Model Law (sections 10, 65 and 66) embraces this 
principle. To avoid government interference, the central bank should have sufficient 
financial resources as well as full authority over its budget. Furthermore, the central bank 
should not be responsible for fiscal losses or conduct quasi-fiscal operations. Financial 
independence also entails that only realised net profits, after prudent provisioning by the 
central bank and allocations to general reserves, should be given to the fiscus. Such 
independence will also allow the central bank to operationally conduct timely and 
sufficient open market operations without financial constraints and in line with the set 
policy goals (Alesina and Summers, 1993). 
 
Credit to government: The law should prohibit or severely limit demands on the central 
bank to finance government budget deficits. This principle, captured in the SADC Model 
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Law’s section 40, argues that temporary advances and loans can be allowed if strict limits 
on the amount are clearly spelt out, and as long as the central bank has authority to 
determine the terms and rates of interest payable. Furthermore, such credit, including any 
indirect credit to the government should be guided by set monetary policy objectives and 
targets (Alesina and Summers, 1993). 
 
Instrument independence: The central bank should have unimpeded authority to use all 
monetary policy instruments available in its toolbox, as and when it sees fit. Instrument 
independence shields the central bank from failure to achieve otherwise attainable 
objectives and targets due to interference from the government. To ensure that the central 
bank is not constrained over instruments in executing monetary policy, Section 10 
empowers the board to determine policies applicable to the bank’s administration and 
operations (Alesina and Summers, 1993). 
 
4. Comparison of National Central Bank Acts with the SADC Model Law 
 
The study by Wessels (2009) focused on legal independence of twelve SADC central banks 
by applying the international best practice CBI yardsticks to the statutes or charters of the 
relevant central banks. This study, however, explores legal CBI in the SADC region by 
examining the convergence or divergence between the SADC Central Bank Model Law and 
the existing central bank charters or acts of twelve of the fourteen SADC member states. 
The extent to which the central bank law goes beyond the leniency provided by the Model 
Law shows a shortfall in the national law and therefore weakens CBI. As in Wessels (2009) 
we examine the content of the central bank acts (with amendments up to the end of 2017) 
of Angola (2010), Botswana (1996), Lesotho (2000), Malawi (1989), Mauritius (2004), 
Namibia (1997), Seychelles (2011); South Africa (1989), Swaziland (1974); Tanzania 
(2006); Zambia (1996) and Zimbabwe (2004); and compare them with the CBI related 
elements of the SADC Central Bank Model Law. Results of this comparison across the 
Central Bank Acts of the 12 SADC member states are outlined in the table below:2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 As in other studies of a similar nature, the CBI elements contained in the SADC Model Law were treated with 
equal weights on a simple binary basis, i.e. compliance with the criteria was assigned 1 for ‘Yes’ and non-
compliance was regarded as 0 for ‘No’. 
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Table 1: National Central Banks and the SADC Model Law: Assessment of CBI Compliance and 
Identifying the Gaps 
 
CBI Elements of 
the SADC Model 
Law  
ANG BOT LES MAL MAU NAM SEY SOU SWA TAN ZAM ZIM Tot
al 
1. Single; clear 
price stability 
objective (s.4,5) 
0 
 
0 
 
1 0 
 
1 0 
 
1 1 0 
 
1 1 0 
 
6 
 
2. Governors 
appointed by 
Head of State, 
ratified by 
parliament (s.11) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
(Ratify
) 
 
1 
 
 
12 
 
3. Tenure of 
Governors is 6 
years; eligible for 
re-appointment 
(s.11) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
1 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-
yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
0 
(5-yr) 
 
1 
 
4. Term of 
Governors does 
NOT coincide 
with elections 
(s.11, note 17, 19) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Unclea
r) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Uncl
ear) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Uncl
ear) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
 
5. Absence of 
politicians or 
Govt. employees 
on Board (s.17, 
note 24) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Govt. 
officers
) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Govt. 
officer
s) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Govt. 
officer
s) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
7 
 
6. Grounds for 
removal of 
Governor; 
commission to 
investigate 
outlined (s.22) 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
1 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
0 
(No 
Com
m.) 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
0 
(No 
Comm.
) 
 
3 
 
7. Locus of 
decision making 
(formulating, 
implementing 
monetary policy) 
lies with Bank 
(s.5, 6, 44) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(govt. 
interve
ne) 
 
1 
 
0 
(govt. 
interv
ene) 
 
1 
 
0 
(govt. 
interv
ene) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(govt. 
interv
ene) 
 
1 
 
0 
(govt. 
interv
ene) 
 
0 
(govt. 
interv
ene) 
 
5 
 
8. Transparency 
& accountability 
(audited records 
made available to 
govt. & 
parliament in 
time (s.60-64) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
12 
 
9. Financial 
independence 
(including control 
over its policies, 
operations & 
budget) clearly 
stipulated: (s.10, 
65-67) 
 
1 
 
0 
(Unclea
r) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
1 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
0 
(Minis
ter 
appro
ves) 
 
6 
 
10. Strict limits on 
lending to Govt. 
(amounts & 
repayment period 
stipulated, i.e. 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(7- 
year 
repay
ment) 
 
1 
 
0 
(20-
year 
govt. 
securit
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Unsp
ecified 
period
) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Inter
vene) 
 
8 
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only short term 
but best practice 
is to prohibit 
lending) V (s.41) 
ies) 
 
11. Instrument 
independence 
(s.5,6,10) 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
(Uncle
ar) 
 
9 
 
TOTAL 
 
4 
 
5 
 
7 
 
6 
 
7 
 
3 
 
10 
 
7 
 
4 
 
8 
 
6 
 
2 
 
69 
 
NB: Angola (ANG), Botswana (BOT), Lesotho (LES), Malawi (MAL), Mauritius (MAU), Namibia (NAM), 
Seychelles (SEY), South Africa (SOU), Swaziland (SWA), Tanzania (TAN), Zambia (ZAM), Zimbabwe (ZIM); 
Comm. = commission to investigate; govt.  = government 
 
In Table 1 above, 11 CBI related elements of the 2009 SADC Central Bank Model Law were 
applied to the central bank acts of twelve SADC member States to assess the extent of 
compliance with the regional Model Law. Although various CBI determinants could be 
more important than others, this paper uses a binary approach rather than assigning 
weights to each of the criteria. The limitation of this methodology is that it does not cover 
macroeconomic or monetary policy implementation, which could explain why relatively 
well performing central banks (in terms of price stability) may not have a correspondingly 
high score. Despite this limitation this approach nonetheless provides a general indication 
of the state of compliance by central bank laws to the SADC Model Law and by extension to 
the CBI principles.  
Based on these criteria the 12 countries had a combined score of only 69 out of a 
possible 132 points, representing a 52 percent overall compliance. With a score of 10 out of 
a possible 12 points, Seychelles was the best performer, followed by Tanzania with 8 
points. Namibia and Zimbabwe score lowest at 3 and 2 points, respectively. We observe a 
slight improvement in the overall scores in this study compared to the Wessels (2009) 
results. One reason is that a few countries such as Angola and Seychelles have since 
reviewed or amended their central bank acts for strengthened CBI. Furthermore, instead of 
employing the more stringent international best practice CBI criteria, in this study we used 
CBI elements as contained in the Model Law. 
 
5. Key Recommendations and Concluding Remarks 
 
Before countries can start using this work and adopting its recommendations a lot of work 
would be required to: (a) determine the reliability and consistency of the SADC Model Law; 
and (b) the compatibility of the Model Law with provisions for fiscal management in fiscal 
(public finance) laws. The results from the analysis of this paper show that some of the 
central bank charters fall short of meeting the critical elements of the regional model law. 
The paper therefore makes the following specific recommendations:  
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First, the central bank charters of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe should explicate that achieving and maintaining price stability is the 
primary objective of monetary policy, and any other objective is subsidiary to this.    
Second, since in all countries the Head of State appoints governors as suggested by 
the SADC Model Law; therefore, parliament should ratify such appointments as in Zambia’s 
case. Furthermore, countries should follow the example of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Seychelles by bestowing an independent body with powers to investigate and sanction any 
dismissals of the governors or directors by the executive. Beside Seychelles which has 
already done so, SADC countries should expound clearly that the governors are eligible for 
reappointment, and that the duration of each term is 6 years, thus avoiding coinciding with 
the usual 5-year political electoral cycles. 
Third, Angola and Zimbabwe are silent on the participation of politicians and 
government officials on the central bank board. The central bank acts of Botswana, Malawi, 
Namibia and Swaziland provide for senior government officials to be part of the board with 
voting rights. All these countries need to effect the needed corrections. 
Fourth, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe should 
remove the provision allowing government to intervene in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Angola, which is mute on the matter, should clearly state that only the central bank has a 
right to conduct monetary policy.  
Fifth, Lesotho and Mauritius should comply with the provision to restrict the 
repayment periods of central bank finance to government. South Africa should specify 
limits on repayment period and the credit amount that the central bank can provide to 
government. Finally, Zimbabwe should reconsider the stipulation giving government 
leeway to set its own credit limits from the central bank.  
Finally, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia should clearly stipulate 
the bank’s control over its budget. Zimbabwe should relax the need for the Minister of 
Finance to approve the central bank’s budget. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe should 
explicitly allow central banks to exercise control over instruments used in executing 
monetary policy. 
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